Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Peters, Hans J. M. ; Roy, Souvik ; Sen, Arunava ; Storcken, Ton |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 52.2014, p. 123-127
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Subject: | Probabilistic rules | Strategy-proof | Single-peaked domain | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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