Promotion, relative performance information, and the Peter Principle
Year of publication: |
May 2018
|
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Authors: | Chan, Eric |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 93.2018, 3, p. 83-103
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Subject: | promotion | incentives | relative performance information | fairness | performance | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Gerechtigkeit | Justice |
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