Prop Ups During Lockups

The end of the lockup period of initial public offerings generally constitutes the first time corporateinsiders sell significant numbers of shares on the market. I test the hypothesis that shareholderspressure analysts to support the share price until the end of the lockup period.[...]

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Year of publication:	2008-11-01
Authors:	Martin, Jens
Institutions:	Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North South <Bern>
Subject:	Analyse \| Kapitalbindung \| Verhalten \| optimising behavior

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I. Introduction
II. Data sources and descriptive statistics
III. The sweet escape hypothesis and its predictions
IV. Analyst coverage around the end of the lockup period
V. Specific groups of insiders
VI. The impact of stricter regulation
VII. Robustness Checks
A. Updating beliefs
B. Earnings announcements around the lockup period
C. Investigating the variation in the length of the lockup period
VIII. The market reaction
IX. Conclusion
X. Bibliography
Appendix A: Why do insiders not sell secondary shares during theIPO?
Appendix B: Robustness Checks
Appendix C: Econometric Comments

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