Provision of incentives for information acquisition : forecast-based contracts vs. menus of linear contracts
Fangruo Chen (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York), Guoming Lai (McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas), Wenqiang Xiao (Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York)
| Year of publication: |
July 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Chen, Fangruo ; Lai, Guoming ; Xiao, Wenqiang |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 62.2016, 7, p. 1899-1914
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| Subject: | information acquisition | sales and operations planning | moral hazard | adverse selection | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives |