Pull and Push Contracts in a Decentralised Assembly System with Random Component Yields

This study investigates how random component yields can influence pricing and production decisions under pull and push contracts. We consider a decentralized assembly system where a manufacturer procures complementary components from two suppliers with random yields. We first characterize the centralized equilibrium decision as a benchmark and then analyse the equilibrium solutions in a decentralized assembly system under each contract. We find that neither contract is always superior to the other in terms of system profit. Under a push contract, suppliers always achieve the first mover advantage with higher payoff. However, the first mover advantage does not hold for the manufacturer under a pull contract. We further conduct sensitivity analysis to study the impact of random component yields and retail price on equilibrium solutions under each contract. Interestingly, the wholesale prices charged by suppliers always increase with supply yield uncertainty under a pull contract, but decrease under a push contract. In contrast with the centralized solution, the equilibrium quantities in the decentralized solution decrease with supply yield uncertainty under both pull and push contracts. We then extend our model to a general case with multiple suppliers. The system payoff decreases with the number of suppliers, and the main results derived in two suppliers setting still hold in the system with multiple suppliers