Quantile stable mechanisms

Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia and M. Bumin Yenmez

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

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Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Chen, Peter ; Egesdal, Michael ; Pycia, Marek ; Yenmez, M. Bumin
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 12.2021, 2, Art.-No. 43, p. 1-9
Subject:	auctions \| contracts \| incentives \| matching \| mechanisms \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Matching \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Auktion \| Auction

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g12020043 [DOI] hdl:10419/257525 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547697