Regret testing : learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent

Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.

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Year of publication:	September 2006
Authors:	Foster, Dean P. ; Young, H. Peyton
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 341-367
Subject:	Learning \| Nash equilibrium \| regret \| bounded rationality \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Begrenzte Rationalität \| Bounded rationality \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit \| Decision under uncertainty \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/150083 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702986