Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Borges, Ana Pinto ; Correira-da-Silva, João ; Laussel, Didier |
Published in: |
Journal of economics. - Wien [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0931-8658, ZDB-ID 635037-9. - Vol. 111.2014, 2, p. 105-130
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Subject: | Procurement | Regulation | Adverse selection | Empire-building | Reservation utility | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Adverse Selektion | Regulierung | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract |
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