Using cost observation to regulate a manger who has a preference for empire-building
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Borges, Ana Pinto ; Correira-da-Silva, João |
Published in: |
The Manchester School. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0025-2034, ZDB-ID 1418920-3. - Vol. 79.2011, 1, p. 29-44
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Subject: | empire-buildung tendency | Führungskräfte | Managers | Anreizregulierung | Incentive regulation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Theorie | Theory |
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