Relational contracts and job design

Anja Schöttner

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent. -- job design ; multi-tasking ; relational contracts

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Year of publication:	Sept. 2005
Other Persons:	Schöttner, Anja (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin : SFB 649, Economic Risk
Subject:	Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Anforderungsprofil \| Occupational profile \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Arbeitsgestaltung \| Job design \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource, 30 S., Text
Series:	SFB 649 discussion paper. - Berlin : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1860-5664, ZDB-ID 2195055-6. - Vol. 2005,052
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/25071 [Handle]
Classification:	M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues) ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003324054