Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 80.2013, p. 157-178
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management |
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