Cover Image

Rent seeking in sequential group contests

Oliver Gürtler
In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is higher than in an individual contest. However, if the order of moves is endogenized, the smaller group will always act prior to the bigger group. Competition between the groups is in this way weakened and the groups are able to save on expenditures.
Year of publication:
2005
Authors: Gürtler, Oliver
Publisher: Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject: Group contest | rent seeking | sequential choices | sharing rule | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game
freely available
Full text |
nbn-resolving.org
Check Google Scholar
In German libraries (KVK)
I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366540
Similar items by subject
Similar items by person