Repeated Nash implementation

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regard less of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is 'large' or 'small.'

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Mezzetti, Claudio ; Renou, Ludovic
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 12.2017, 1, p. 249-285
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Dynamic monotonicity \| Nash implementation \| Maskin monotonicity \| repeated implementation \| repeated games

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1988 [DOI] 896029875 [GVK] hdl:10419/197189 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1988 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010069