Repeated proximity games

We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds for any payoff function if and only if the graph is 2-connected, and then extend this result to the context of finitely repeated games.

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Year of publication:	1998-12-16
Authors:	Renault, JÊrÆme ; Tomala, Tristan
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 27.1998, 4, p. 539-559
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Repeated games \| Folk theorem \| imperfect monitoring \| graphs

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received June 1997/Revised version March 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755643