Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
Year of publication: |
January 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Weinstein, Jonathan ; Yildiz, Muhamet |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 1, p. 157-185
|
Subject: | Reputation | repeated games | commitment | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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