Reward self-reporting to deter corruption : an experiment on mitigating collusive bribery
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wu, Kevin ; Abbink, Klaus |
Publisher: |
Canberra : Monash Univ., Dep. of Economics |
Subject: | Korruption | Corruption | Experiment | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Theorie | Theory | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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