Rewarding improvements : optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chan, Jimmy ; Zheng, Bingyong |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 42.2011, 4, p. 758-775
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Bewertung | Evaluation |
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