Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions : How to Bid without Knowing What Others Are Doing

We show how to bid in first-price auctions when a bidder knows her own value but not how others will bid. To do this we introduce a novel and general method for how to make choices in strategic settings without assuming common knowledge or equilibrium behavior. Accordingly, first eliminate environments that are believed not to occur and then find a robust rule that performs well in the remaining environments. We test our bid recommendations using data from laboratory experiments and from the field. We find that our bids outperform those made by the real bidders

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Kasberger, Bernhard
Other Persons:	Schlag, Karl H. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Experiment

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