Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance

Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó

Year of publication:	[2018]
Authors:	Ehlers, Lars H. ; Massó, Jordi
Publisher:	[Montréal] : [Départment de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal]
Subject:	Many-to-one matching market \| Stability \| Incomplete information \| Monotonic responsive extensions \| Robust mechanism design \| Matching \| Unvollkommene Information \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Robustes Verfahren \| Robust statistics \| Marktmechanismus \| Market mechanism

freely available

Full text |

More access options

papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848623

A service of the