Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar |
Publisher: |
München : CESifo |
Subject: | auctions and security design | agency problems | mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktion | Auction | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrag | Contract |
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