Sensitivity analysis of markup equilibria in complementary markets
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Correa, José R. ; Lederman, Roger ; Stier-Moses, Nicolás E. |
Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 42.2014, 2, p. 173-179
|
Subject: | Noncooperative games | Oligopoly models | Supply function equilibrium | Bundling | Pricing | Sensitivity analysis | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Sensitivitätsanalyse | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Preiselastizität | Price elasticity | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Mark-up Pricing | Mark-up pricing | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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