Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually increasing offers.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Schweinzer, Paul
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Gradual bargaining \| Common values \| Incomplete information \| Repeated games

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 136
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13415 [DOI] 789977176 [GVK] hdl:10419/94025 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:136 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334002