Silence can be golden : on the value of allowing managers to keep silent when information is soft

Tsahi Versano

Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Versano, Tsahi
Published in:	Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 71.2021, 2/3, p. 1-19
Subject:	Bonus schemes \| Mandatory disclosure \| Reliability \| Soft information \| Verifiability \| Voluntary disclosure \| Unternehmenspublizität \| Corporate disclosure \| Informationswert \| Information value \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Öffentlichkeitsarbeit \| Public relations \| Auskunftspflicht \| Disclosure regulation \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay

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