Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information

We compare equilibria with sequential and simultaneous moves under homogeneous-good Bertrand competition when unit costs are private information. Under an alternative interpretation, we examine the consequences of awarding a right of first refusal in a first-price procurement auction with endogenous quantity.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Arozamena, Leandro ; Weinschelbaum, Federico
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 104.2009, 1, p. 23-26
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Oligopoly Auctions with endogenous quantity Right of first refusal Second-mover advantage

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023496