Social Networks, Reputation and Commitment : Evidence from a Savings Monitors Experiment

Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar

In 30 villages, we randomly assign monitors to a subset of savers. An average monitor increases total savings by 35%. Increasing the monitor's network centrality by one standard deviation increases savings by 14%, and increasing proximity from social distance three to two increases savings by 16%

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Year of publication:	May 2015
Authors:	Breza, Emily
Other Persons:	Chandrasekhar, Arun G. (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Soziales Netzwerk \| Social network \| Sparen \| Savings \| Informationsverbreitung \| Information dissemination \| Feldforschung \| Field research \| Altersvorsorge \| Retirement provision \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Indien \| India \| Reputation \| Dorf \| Village \| Experiment

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w21169
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w21169 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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