Social Structure and Institutional Design : Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Horacio Larreguy

Assigning a third party at the 75th percentile of the centrality distribution (as compared to the 25th) increases efficiency by 21% relative to the mean: we attribute 2/5 of the effect to monitoring and 3/5 to enforcement. The largest efficiency increase occurs when senders and receivers are socially distant, unable to maintain efficient levels autonomously. Results cannot be explained by demographics such as elite status, caste, wealth or gender

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Year of publication:	July 2014
Authors:	Breza, Emily
Other Persons:	Chandrasekhar, Arun G. (contributor) ; Larreguy, Horacio (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Indien \| India \| Experiment \| Feldforschung \| Field research \| Institutionenökonomik \| Institutional economics \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Soziales Netzwerk \| Social network \| Investition \| Investment \| Dorf \| Village \| Sozialstruktur \| Social structure \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w20309
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w20309 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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