Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information : who benefits and is it stable?

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Published in:	Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 102.2022, p. 1-8
Subject:	Bertrand games \| Corporate espionage \| Incomplete information \| Stackelberg games \| Value of information in games \| Unvollkommene Information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Informationswert \| Information value \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly

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