Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Vieille, Nicolas
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Public value of information \| Games with incomplete information \| Bandit problems

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, Vol. 42, no. 1. pp. 25-47.Length: 22 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707510