Strategic revenue management of preemptive versus non-preemptive queues
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Chamberlain, Jonathan ; Starobinski, David |
Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 49.2021, 2, p. 184-187
|
Subject: | Game theory | Preemption | Pricing | Queuing theory | Warteschlangentheorie | Queueing theory | Spieltheorie | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy |
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