Strategy-proof and anonymous allocation rules of indivisible goods: A new characterization of Vickrey allocation rule

We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	strategy-proofness \| anonymity \| indivisible good \| Vickrey allocation rule

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 648
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	512142475 [GVK] hdl:10419/92890 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332504