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The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Year of publication:
2009
Authors: Fujinaka, Yuji ; Sakai, Toyotaka
Published in:
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 38.2009, 3, p. 325-348
Publisher: Springer
Subject: Consequence of strategic manipulation | Nash implementation | Mechanism design | Existence of ɛ-Nash equilibrium | Strategy-proofness | Indivisible good
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Type of publication: Article
Source:
RePEc - Research Papers in Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015008
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