Strategy-Proof and Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good on Finitely Restricted Preference Domains

We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences. Key words: Strategy-proofness, efficiency, domain restriction

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Ohseto, Shinji
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Güter \| Goods \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]