Strategy Proofness and Coalitional Stability in Assignment Problems with Externalities

We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to group deviations. We present notions of core consistent with such expectations and identify the largest and smallest cores. We restrict the domain of preferences to study the relationship between essentially single valued cores and the existence of strategy-proof, individually rational, and efficient mechanisms

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Year of publication:	[2023]
Authors:	Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée ; Triossi, Matteo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2, 2023 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4405421 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D62 - Externalities ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014358116