Strategy-proofness and indentical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
Year of publication: |
June 2018
|
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Authors: | Hashimoto, Kazuhiko |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 65.2018, 4, p. 1045-1078
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Subject: | Strategy-proofness | Pareto-efficiency | Identical preferences lower bound | Top trading cycle rule | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Allokation | Allocation | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency |
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