Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters : a direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Year of publication: |
1983
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Authors: | Barberá, Salvador |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 24.1983, 2, p. 413-417
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Subject: | Wohlstandstheorie | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem |
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