Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Brandt, Felix ; Saile, Christian ; Stricker, Christian |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 202.2022, p. 1-26
|
Subject: | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | Pareto optimality | Social choice theory | Strategyproofness | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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