Strong Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Holocaust Alternative. We finally provide an applications of our result in a pure matching environment

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Savva, Foivos
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Vertrauen \| Confidence \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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