Structural remedies as a signalling device

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey

We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.

Year of publication:	January 2016
Authors:	Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus ; Wey, Christian
Publisher:	Düsseldorf, Germany : dup, düsseldorf university press
Subject:	Remedies \| Divestiture \| Merger Control \| Signalling \| Fusionskontrolle \| Merger control \| Theorie \| Theory \| Entflechtung \| Unbundling \| Fusion \| Merger \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy

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