Subjective performance evaluation of employees with biased beliefs
Year of publication: |
[2017]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Foschi, Matteo ; Santos-Pinto, Luís |
Publisher: |
Badia Fiesolana, Italy : European University Institute |
Subject: | Optimism | Overconfidence | Contract | Moral Hazard | Biased Beliefs | Mechanism Design | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Experiment | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrauen | Confidence |
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