Supply Chain Coordination Model Under Green and Conformance Quality Sensitive Consumer Demand and Cost-Sharing Contract

This paper considers consumers' concerns about the conformance quality and greenness of products to investigate the impact of two coordination models, capital coordination and cost-sharing, on the optimal decision of a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers. The demand for a product depends not only on price but also on its greenness, conformance quality, and marketing efforts. Assume that the manufacturer offers trade credit to the cash-strapped retailers on the one hand and discounts the wholesale price to the financially solid retailers for upfront payments on the other. Based on this financial coordination, we further consider sharing investment costs in the three categories of conformance quality, greenness, and marketing effort. The equilibrium results of the game are obtained in three scenarios using the Stackelberg game approach, and numerical examples are provided for the profit levels of the manufacturer and retailer in the different scenarios, as well as for the conformance quality and greenness of the product. The model analysis framework and results are essential references for selecting and decision-making green supply chain coordination approaches