Takeover Defenses and Dilution : A Welfare Analysis

Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them. However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities. This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may in fact be excessive

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Year of publication:	[2001]
Authors:	Chakraborty, Atreya
Other Persons:	Arnott, Richard J. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2001]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 6, 2000 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.260668 [DOI]
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012742618