Task assignment and pay dispersion under moral hazard
Clemens Löffler, Christian Schmid
| Year of publication: |
2024
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Löffler, Clemens ; Schmid, Christian |
| Published in: |
Management accounting research. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1044-5005, ZDB-ID 1470985-5. - Vol. 64.2024, Art.-No. 100866, p. 1-12
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| Subject: | Efficiency in risk bearing | Incentive compensation | Pay dispersion | Performance measurement | Risk aversion | Task assignment | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Lohnstruktur | Wage structure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Performance-Messung | Risiko | Risk |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.mar.2023.100866 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015061249