Tendering design when price and quality is uncertain : theory and evidence from public procurement

Mats A. Bergman; Sofia Lundberg

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Bergman, Mats A. ; Lundberg, Sofia
Publisher:	Umeå : Univ., Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Öffentlicher Auftrag \| Public contract \| Lieferantenbewertung \| Supplier evaluation \| Scoring-Modell \| Scoring model \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Habit-Persistence-Hypothese \| Habit-persistence hypothesis \| Schweden \| Sweden

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413610

A service of the