The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, worse products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012-10-15
Authors:	Danilov, Anastasia ; Biemann, Torsten ; Kring, Thorn ; Sliwka, Dirk
Institutions:	Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	deception \| team incentives \| professionals \| financial advice \| experiment

freely available

Full text |

More access options

www.cgs.uni-koeln.de

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 03-13
Classification:	C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842856