The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Oexl, Regine |
Subject: | Gift exchange | Incomplete contracts | Laboratory experiments | Long-term contracts | Principal agent model | Random shocks | Reciprocity | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Experiment | Schock | Shock | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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