The ombudsman : is the evidence sufficient to take action on executive pay? ; reply to commentators
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Armstrong, J. Scott Armstrong ; Jacquart Philippe |
Other Persons: | Armstrong, Christopher S. (reviewed) ; Deci, Edward L. (reviewed) ; Ryan, Richard M. (reviewed) ; Jones, Derek C. (reviewed) ; Hogarth, Robin M. (reviewed) ; Kolev, Gueorgui I. (reviewed) |
Published in: |
Interfaces : the INFORMS journal on the practice of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0092-2102, ZDB-ID 120785-4. - Vol. 43.2013, 6, p. 602-604
|
Subject: | corporate governance | executive compensation | incentives | Mondragon | say on pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Großbritannien | United Kingdom | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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