The ombudsman : are top executives paid enough? : an evidence-based review
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Jacquart, Philippe ; Armstrong, J. Scott |
Published in: |
Interfaces : the INFORMS journal on the practice of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0092-2102, ZDB-ID 120785-4. - Vol. 43.2013, 6, p. 580-589
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Subject: | bonus | cooperatives | corporate governance | democracy | employee selection | executive compensation | incentives | index methods | judgmental bootstrapping | Mondragon | motivation | pay | performance | stakeholders | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Stakeholder | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Personalauswahl | Personnel selection | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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