The optimality of ad valorem contracts
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Hagiu, Andrei ; Wright, Julian |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 11, p. 5219-5233
|
Subject: | revenue sharing | channel coordination | moral hazard | private information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertriebsweg | Distribution channel |
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