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The paradox of power : principal-agent problems and fiscal capacity in absolutist regimes

Debin Ma, Jared Rubin
Year of publication:
2017
Authors: Ma, Debin ; Rubin, Jared
Publisher: [Orange, CA] : [Chapman University, Economic Science Institute]
Subject: administrative capacity | fiscal capacity | state capacity | principal-agent problem,monitoring | credible commitment | absolutism | limited government | taxation | China,Europe | Qing Empire | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | China | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy
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