The rise of individual performance pay

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in humancapital intensive industries? We present a model that may explainthis. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ana-lyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimeswhen agents possess indispensable human capital. We show that thelarger the share of values that the agents can hold-up, the lower is theimplementable degree of peer dependent incentives...

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Year of publication:	2008-12-15
Authors:	Kvaløy, Ola ; Olsen, Trond E.
Institutions:	Universitetet <Stavanger> / School of Business Administration
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Humankapital \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Contract of employment

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Extent:	241664 bytes 33 p. application/pdf
Series:	Universitetet i Stavanger - School of Business Administration - Publications UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 3/2009
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Labour law and industrial relations ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009305237